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13 December 201611 while it is currently only man-
datory when a nutrition claim is made.12. Articles 
29 to 35 of Regulation (EU) No. 1169/2011 establish 
detailed requirements for nutrition declarations, and 
also address issues like the eventual expression on 
a per portion basis or per consumption unit. Food 
business operators should analyse in detail the new 
EU rules on nutrition labelling and the possibilities 
which Regulation (EU) No. 1169/2011 provide to pro-
mote the nutritional properties of foodstuffs. The re-
spective labels on food products should, however, be 
carefully assessed so as to ensure compliance with 
these detailed and not always straightforward rules.
Intellectual Property
This section is devoted to giving readers an inside 
view of the crossing point between intellectual prop-
erty (IP) law and risk regulation. In addition to up-
dating readers on the latest developments in IP law 
and policies in technological fields (including chemi-
cals, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, agriculture 
and foodstuffs), the section aims at verifying whether 
such laws and policies really stimulate scientific and 
technical progress and are capable of minimising the 
risks posed by on-going industrial developments to 
individuals’ health and safety, inter alia.
Stem Cells Industry and Beyond:  
What is the Aftermath of Brüstle?
Enrico Bonadio*
I.  Introduction
On 18 October 2011 the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (CJEU) released its decision in Brüstle 
v Greenpeace.1 This is a widely reported case on the 
exclusion from patentability of inventions related to 
human embryonic stem cells (HESCs) on morality 
grounds.
This report aims to verify whether the Brüstle 
ruling may expose the EU and some of its Mem-
ber States to a WTO challenge for failing to comply 
with Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement as well 
as whether the decision may have an impact in fields 
other than HESCs and thus be invoked to oppose 
the issuance, or challenge the validity, of any patent 
obtained through immoral or unlawful activities.
II.  The decision
The facts of the case are well-known. Dr. Olivier Brüs-
tle from the University of Bonn obtained a German 
patent covering isolated and purified neural precursor 
cells produced from HECSs.2 By growing specific tis-
sue from these cells, this invention is intended to treat 
damaged organs in patients suffering from various 
diseases including Parkinson’s. Greenpeace success-
fully challenged the patent before the Federal Patent 
Court on morality grounds: it was basically argued 
that patenting an invention based on a human em-
bryo which is later destroyed is unethical. Dr. Brüstle 
appealed the decision before the German Supreme 
Court which eventually referred the case to the CJEU. 
The CJEU was asked to interpret Article 6(2)(c) of Di-
rective 98/44 on the patentability of biotechnological 
inventions (Biotech Directive3), according to which, 
“uses of human embryos for industrial or commer-
cial purposes” are not patentable. Article 6(2) lists 
some examples of non-patentable inventions4, which 
11 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food informa-
tion to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and 
(EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Di-
rective 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 
2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Com-
mission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, OJ 2011 L 304/18.
12 Article 2(2) of Council Directive 90/496/EEC on nutrition labelling, 
OJ 1990 L 276/40.
* Lecturer in Law, City University London. The author may be 
reached at <enrico.bonadio.1@city.ac.uk>. 
1 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V., Case C-34/10, decision of 
18 October 2011.
2 For a brief technical overview of HESCs and the associated ethical 
concerns see Kenneth C. Cheney, “Patentability of Stem Cell 
Research under TRIPS: Can Morality-Based Exclusions be Better 
Defined by Emerging Customary International Law?”, 29 Loyola 
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review (2007), 
pp. 505 et sqq.
3 The directive was adopted on 6 July 1998. The Netherlands 
brought Case C-377/98 before the CJEU against the adoption of 
the directive with six different pleas and requested the annulment 
of the directive. In its ruling of 9 October 2001 the Court dismissed 
the application brought by the Netherlands and confirmed the 
validity of the directive.
4 The list also includes the following non-patentable inventions: (a) 
processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying 
the germ line genetic identity of human beings; (c) processes for 
modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause 
them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or 
animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.
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intends to guide the implementation and interpreta-
tion of the broader morality clause of Article 6(1), 
according to which inventions cannot be patented 
if their commercial exploitation is contrary to ordre 
public or morality.5
In its decision of 18 October 2011 the CJEU first 
gave a broad interpretation of “human embryos” 
under Article 6(2)(c) by clarifying that any human 
ovum, as soon as fertilized, should be considered 
a “human embryo” if the fertilization is such as to 
commence the process of development of a human 
being. The above term, added the Court, also covers 
cells that are artificially stimulated or manipulated 
but not fertilized and which are able to trigger the 
development of a human being (so called partheno-
genesis).6
The Court also interpreted the expression, “uses 
of human embryos for industrial or commercial pur-
poses”, under Article 6(2)(c). The issue was basically 
whether the use of embryos for research purposes 
amounts to a use for a mere commercial aim. The 
CJEU admitted that, in general, the concept of scien-
tific research must be distinguished from industrial 
or commercial purposes. Yet, held the Court, as pat-
ent rights are in principle connected with activities 
of an industrial and commercial nature, the use of 
human embryos for the purposes of research which 
constitutes the subject matter of a patent application 
(as it was in Brüstle) cannot be separated from the 
patent itself and cannot therefore enjoy protection.7
The final issue decided by the CJEU was whether 
an invention involving the destruction of human 
embryos can be considered patentable even though 
the patent specification (as in Brüstle) does not men-
tion said destructive use. The Court held that such 
invention is not patentable.8 Indeed, not excluding 
them from patentability would allow patent attor-
neys to skilfully draft claims to gain patentability on 
an otherwise non-patentable invention under Article 
6(2) of the Biotech Directive. The CJEU thus held that 
an invention is not patentable if its implementation 
requires either the prior destruction of human em-
bryos or their prior use as base material, even though 
the patent application does not mention such prior 
destruction or use.9 As noted by the Advocate Gen-
eral, if that were not the case, the prohibition under 
Article 6(2) of the Biotech Directive would be easy 
to get around, as the applicant would simply have 
to avoid mentioning in the application that human 
embryos were destroyed or used: in such a manner 
the provision would be deprived of its effective- 
ness.10
The biotech industry has obviously criticised the 
ruling. One possible negative consequence – noted 
the industry – could be a “brain drain” towards 
more biotech-friendly countries such as the United 
States where there are no statutory limits on patent 
 eligibility of inventions on moral and ordre public 
grounds.11 In a letter published in the well-known 
scientific journal, Nature, on 28 April 2011 (a few 
weeks after the opinion released by Advocate Gen-
eral Bot, which was almost entirely followed in the 
CJEU’s ruling), several scientists expressed their 
 “profound concerns” about the possibility of a lack of 
patent protection in a highly R&D intensive industry 
such as the HESCs field.12
5 Analogous provisions are contained in Article 27(2) of the TRIPS 
Agreement (“Members may exclude from patentability inventions, 
the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploita-
tion of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality”) and 
Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention (EPC) (“European 
patents shall not be granted in respect of: (a) inventions the com-
mercial exploitation of which would be contrary to “ordre public” 
or morality […]”. Rule 28 EPC reflects the contents of Article 6(2) 
of the Biotech Directive. The EPC Guidelines, Part C, C-IV and 
paragraph 4.1 confirm that the purpose of the patentability exclu-
sion under Article 53(a) EPC is “to deny protection to inventions 
likely to induce riot or public disorder, or to lead to criminal or 
other generally offensive behavior”. The Guidelines mention anti-
personnel mines as an obvious example and note that this excep-
tion is likely to be relied on in extreme cases only, e.g. when the 
invention applied for is so abhorrent that the grant of the patent 
would be inconceivable.
6 See paragraphs 35-36 of the decision.
7 See paragraphs 42-43 of the decision.
8 The European Parliament’s “Resolution on Patents for Biotechno-
logical Inventions” of 26 October 2005 (P6_TA (2005) 0407) had 
already endorsed this position: “The European Parliament insists 
that the creation of human embryonic stem cells implies the de-
struction of human embryos and that therefore the patenting of 
procedures involving human embryonic stem cells or cells that are 
grown from human embryonic stem cells is a violation of Article 
6(2) of the Directive” (paragraph 14).
9 It is clear from the way the third question was formulated that the 
said prior use of human embryos is a destructive one.
10 See paragraph 108 AG’s opinion.
11 It should, however, be noted that the Brüstle ruling does not affect 
future HESCs inventions which do not involve the destruction of 
human embryos. This is an interesting point as new approaches 
have recently been proposed for deriving HESCs lines without in-
juring embryos.
12 Yet, the patenting of HESCs inventions has also been blamed for 
paving the way towards anticompetitive behaviors. In particular, 
it has been argued that many HESCs patents rely on very broad 
claims, which might stifle follow-on innovation in the nascent stem 
cells industry. See Antonina Bakardjieva, “Stem Cells Patenting and 
Competition Law”, in Aurora Plomer and Paul Torremans (eds.), 
Embryonic Stem Cell Patents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 372.
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III.  A possible WTO implication  
of the ruling 
The CJEU’s decision may expose the EU and some of 
its Member States to litigation before the WTO adju-
dicatory bodies for allegedly violating Article 27(2) of 
the TRIPS Agreement.13 As already mentioned, this 
provision states that, “Members may exclude from 
patentability inventions, the prevention within their 
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, includ-
ing to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment”. 
Thus far WTO courts have given no interpretation 
of this provision. Yet it is believed that it should be 
interpreted as allowing the exclusion from patent-
ability of a given invention only if at the same time 
the distribution and sale of the relevant product is 
prohibited.14 This provision was lobbied for by indus-
trialised countries during the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations and mainly directed at developing and least 
developed nations. Indeed, absent this provision, the 
latter states could have pursued free-riding strategies 
by allowing the commercial exploitation of foreign 
inventions locally while maliciously prohibiting their 
patentability.
Another interpretation of Article 27(2) of the 
TRIPS Agreement has been proposed according 
to which an actual ban on the sale of the relevant 
products would not be required as a condition for 
introducing an exclusion from patentability on the 
above grounds: a state would just need to prove that 
there is a mere necessity to prevent the commercial 
exploitation of the invention15. Such interpretation 
seems to be flawed. As has been noted, how could 
a state realistically claim that the prevention of the 
commercial exploitation of an invention in its ter-
ritory is necessary if it simultaneously allows said 
commercial exploitation?16 It seems thus reasonable 
to affirm that, in order to comply with this TRIPS 
provision, a country should guarantee that there is a 
symmetrical correspondence between ethical norms 
built inside patent law and moral provisions applied 
outside patent law.17 This was also the position of the 
European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Citizens’ Rights of 25 June 1997 in the context 
of the discussions which eventually led to the enact-
ment of the Biotech Directive.18
Having said that, the Brüstle decision – which has 
affirmed the non-patentability of HESCs inventions 
that involve the destruction of human embryos – 
may expose the EU to a challenge under Article 27(2) 
of the TRIPS Agreement. Indeed, research and com-
mercial activities which involve the use of human 
embryos, including destructive uses, are not specifi-
cally prohibited by EU legislation.19 Some Member 
countries that have adopted quite liberal legislation 
in this specific regard (such as the United Kingdom) 
might also be involved in WTO litigation on the 
same grounds. And both the EU and those Member 
States which are “permissive” in the field of HESCs 
research would probably be unable to prove that in 
such a field there is a symmetrical correspondence 
between ethical norms built inside patent law (as is 
known, EU Member States must respect and follow 
CJEU rulings, including therefore the Brüstle deci-
sion) and moral provisions applied outside patent law.
In addition to a possible violation of the TRIPS 
Agreement, such a “systemic incoherence”20 between 
legislation applied outside patent law and patent-re-
lated case law seems to violate the principle of legal 
certainty. The ruling in Brüstle, in particular, car-
ries the risk of legitimising a paradoxical situation, 
which has obviously been highlighted and criticised 
by the biotech industry: i.e. the fact that the CJEU 
has rendered unpatentable what is not deemed as 
morally unacceptable by EU legislation and in sev-
eral EU countries.
13 The TRIPS Agreement was signed by all WTO member countries 
in 1994 and covers all types of intellectual property including pat-
ents, copyright and trademarks. It requires intellectual property 
rights to be protected in all WTO member countries.
14 See Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p. 785.
15 See Dan Leskien and Michael Flitner, “Intellectual Property Rights 
and Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis System”, 
IPGRI, Issues in Genetic Resources No. 6, 1997, p. 15, available on 
the Internet at <ftp://ftp.cgiar.org/ipgri/Publications/pdf/497.pdf> 
(last accessed on 4 January 2012).
16 See Gerard Porter, “Human Embryos, Patents and Global Trade: 
Assessing the Scope and Contents of the TRIPS Morality Excep-
tion”, in Plomer and Torremans (eds.), Embryonic Stem Cell Pat-
ents, supra note 12, pp. 359–360.
17 See Aurora Plomer, “Towards Systemic Legal Conflict: Article 6(2)
(c) of the EU Directive on Biotechnological Inventions”, in Plomer 
and Torremans (eds.), Embryonic Stem Cell Patents, supra note 12, 
p. 178.
18 Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights, 25 June 1997, 
A4-0222/97. Report on the Proposal for a European Parliament 
and Council Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions/COM/95/0661.
19 See Plomer, “Towards Systemic Legal Conflict”, supra note 17, 
p. 180.
20 Ibid., p. 186.
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IV.  Extending the effect of the ruling
One might also wonder whether the Brüstle decision 
might be invoked in other fields, for instance, in or-
der to oppose the issuance, or challenge the valid-
ity, of patents covering inventions reached through 
unlawful activities. Indeed, as we have seen in the 
case at issue, it was held that an invention cannot be 
patented on morality grounds if its implementation 
requires either the prior destruction of human em-
bryos or their prior use as base material, even though 
no reference to said prior destruction or use is made 
in the application. What can be learned from the 
ruling is that the full history of the invention is to 
be taken into account when applying morality and 
ordre public clauses. In other words, patent officers 
and judges should inquire whether the invention is 
built on immoral foundations, and not only whether 
the invention can be described in a moral manner 
when filing the patent application.
Two considerations stem from the above-finding 
of the Court.
First, the decision seems to contradict what the 
very CJEU held ten years earlier in the proceedings 
instituted against the Biotech Directive. On that oc-
casion the Court noted that the directive in question 
regards only the issuance of patents and its “scope 
does not extend to activities before and after the 
grant, whether they involve research or the use of 
the patented products”.21
Second, the ruling leaves open a thorny ques-
tion. How far must patent officers and judges dig 
to find an immoral act upon which an invention is 
based? In other words, what distance must there 
be between an immoral act and the patenting of 
the downstream product or process? The Advo-
cate General in Brüstle dealt with this issue. He 
interestingly noted that one of the decisions of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia found that several prisoners had been 
murdered with the intention to extract their organs 
for trafficking. He then asked himself the follow-
ing question: if instead of trafficking there were 
experiments leading to new and inventive products 
or processes, would such inventions have had to 
have been considered as patentable on the grounds 
that how they had been reached was not included 
in the application? The Advocate General seemed 
to believe that these hypothetical inventions would 
be considered non-patentable based on morality 
grounds.22
Many other examples could be given. For instance, 
does the use of slave or child labour in the manu-
facturing process of certain goods (e.g., rubber for 
tires made by Liberian slaves, footballs and sporting 
shoes made by Pakistani children, etc.) entail that 
said products could not be patented because they 
are morally unacceptable? Again there is no easy 
answer, even though the above observation by the 
Advocate General in Brüstle favors an affirmative 
response.
If an affirmative answer is eventually given to 
the above question, it is proposed to exclude from 
patentability on morality grounds the (many) biotech 
patents obtained as a result of the misappropriation 
of genetic resources. Indeed, as is well-known, many 
biotech-related patents in the last decades have been 
granted, and are nowadays still being granted, to 
companies or universities established in industri-
alised countries, but the relevant inventions use 
germplasm gathered in biodiversity-rich develop-
ing states, e.g. DNA sequences or genes extracted 
by plants which have particular and commercially 
valuable properties. This often occurs without re-
quiring and obtaining prior informed consent from 
the country or local community which provides 
the germplasm in question, i.e. the raw material of 
the inventions. And it also often happens that the 
natural or legal persons that obtain these patents 
do not share the benefits stemming from the com-
mercial exploitation of the invention with the local 
communities that have provided the raw materials 
and maintained their valuable properties throughout 
many years and sometimes even centuries.23 These 
activities may also turn out to be contrary to key 
principles established by the Rio de Janeiro Conven-
tion on Biodiversity.24
The point is thus the following. If the Advocate 
General in Brüstle believed that a hypothetical in-
vention reached through experiments on the organs 
21 See paragraph 79 of the decision (Case C-377/98).
22 See paragraphs 106–108 AG’s opinion.
23 The cases are many and have been widely reported. See for 
example the “enola”, “neem” and “ayahuasca” cases. See also the 
position of Peru in the context of the WTO talks (WTO document 
IP/C/W/447, p. 6).
24 The Biodiversity Convention was signed in 1992 and entered into 
force in December 1993. It establishes, (i) that states enjoy sov-
ereignty rights on the genetic resources found on their territories, 
(ii) a system which allows respect for “prior informed consent” of 
the country providing the resource. and (iii) the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of the resources 
with the above entity.
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of murdered prisoners could not be patented based 
on morality grounds, why could not we deem non-
patentable, on the same grounds, patents obtained 
through the misappropriation of genetic resources? 
It seems indeed that the distance between such acts 
of misappropriation and the subsequent inventions 
is no greater than the distance between the experi-
ments on the organs of murdered prisoners and the 
downstream inventions.25
V.  Conclusion
The Brüstle ruling has already been the object of hot 
debates and will continue to spur discussion in the 
months to come.
It is difficult to foresee whether a WTO action 
under Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement will be 
eventually taken against the EU and/or some of its 
Member States. Indeed, the stem cell industry is still 
in its infancy and countries such as the United States 
may not be interested in running the risk associated 
with WTO litigation, especially considering that the 
provision in question – as we have seen – might be 
interpreted in different ways.
The ruling might also be open to extensive inter-
pretation, and in particular it could be relied on in 
fields other than HESCs, for example in order to op-
pose the issuance, or challenge the validity, of pat-
ents covering any inventions obtained through ille-
gal activities, including biotech inventions reached 
through the misappropriation of genetic resources. 
Indeed, one might argue that patent applicants 
should not be able to avoid a refusal or an invalida-
tion decision just because upstream unlawful activi-
ties, which have been necessary to reach the inven-
tion, are not mentioned in the application.
Lifestyle Risks
This section discusses the regulation of “lifestyle 
risks”, a term that can apply to both substances and 
behaviours. Lifestyle risks take place along the line 
of “abstinence – consumption – abuse – addiction”. 
This can concern substances such as food, alcohol 
or drugs, as well as behaviours such as gambling 
or sports. The section also addresses the question of 
the appropriate point of equilibrium between free 
choice and state intervention (regulation), as well as 
the question of when risks can be considered to be 
acceptable or tolerable. In line with the interdiscipli-
nary scope of the journal, the section aims at updat-
ing readers on both the regulatory and the scientific 
developments in the field. It analyses legislative ini-
tiatives and judicial decisions and at the same time 
it provides insight into recent empirical studies on 
lifestyle risks.
Lifestyle Risk: The Challenging 
Marriage of Two Thorny Concepts 
Liana Giorgi*
The terms lifestyle and risk are so commonplace 
 today that we tend to take their meaning (and social 
history) for granted. This is unfortunate, since neither 
of them is either value-free or unequivocal. Linking 
them – in an abstract sense as well as with regard 
to policy – is therefore bound to raise multiple ques-
tions regarding the definition of boundaries. If we 
 recognise that lifestyle is not a matter of individual 
agency alone but also a question of structure  and, 
similarly, if risk  assessment is not just determining ob-
jects or incidences of risk but also about establishing 
the  societal and environmental contexts within which 
specific negative outcomes are more likely to happen, 
then we are confronted with the challenge of how to 
approach the subject of lifestyle risk without falling 
prey to the temptation to impose normative expecta-
tions This paper takes issue with some of the ideas 
advanced in the article by Planzer and Alemanno 
published in EJRR 4/2010 “Lifestyle Risks: Conceptu-
alization of an Emerging Category of Research” by 
considering the framing of the concept of lifestyle risk. 
The emergence of this concept is symptomatic of a 
general trend from both the right and the left of the 
25 In the context of WTO talks some states have adopted similar 
views. See the position of Peru which has proposed to add an 
additional letter to Article 27(2) TRIPS, by specifying that WTO 
Member States may also exclude from patentability “(c) products 
or processes which directly or indirectly include genetic resources 
or traditional knowledge obtained in the absence of compliance 
with international and national legislation on the subject, includ-
ing failure to obtain the prior informed consent of the country of 
origin or the community concerned and failure to reach agreement 
on conditions for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits aris-
ing from their use. Nothing in TRIPS shall prevent Members from 
adopting enforcement measures in their domestic legislation, in ac-
cordance with the principles and obligations enshrined in the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity” (see WTO document IP/C/W/447, 
p. 13). * Social Scientist, Policy Analyst and Writer.
